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CAN TRACK AND FIELD’S GOVERNING BODY BAN 
FEMALE RUNNERS FROM COMPETING IN THE U.S. 
BECAUSE OF HIGH TESTOSTERONE LEVELS? 
Ronald S. Katz* and Robert W. Luckinbill** 
This article explores the applicability, if any, in the United States 
of a decision rendered by a private sports arbitration organization in 
Lausanne, Switzerland: the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).  The 
decision validated regulations of World Athletics—the private organiza-
tion that governs track and field internationally—which had the effect of 
banning an Olympic champion, Caster Semenya of South Africa, from 
international competition against females because she had testosterone 
levels that World Athletics deemed too high. 
The article focuses on the fact that the CAS decision uses the law of 
Monaco to decide the matter.  CAS specifically states that the decision 
may not apply in other countries like the U.S.  CAS expressly leaves such 
decisions to the courts of the respective countries involved. 
The article then explores the reasoning of CAS with respect to both 
the U.S. law of discrimination and the law of evidence.  The article con-
cludes that the CAS decision would not stand up under either set of laws 
in the United States.  In particular, most of the evidence relied on by 
CAS would not be admissible in U.S. courts because of the standards set 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 
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In April 2019, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), a private 
body headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, issued a decision (“the 
Arbitration Award”) against a South African middle-distance runner, 
Caster Semenya.1  In the decision, the arbitration panel ruled that Ms. 
Semenya—whom all parties to the arbitration and the arbitration panel 
itself acknowledged is legally a woman—and runners like her, with nat-
urally-occurring testosterone levels deemed too high by the sport’s gov-
erning body, World Athletics, will have to comply with recently adopted 
 
 1. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 2, ¶ 3, 163, ¶ 1 (2019). 
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regulations, and take testosterone-reducing hormones in order to com-
pete internationally.2 
The arbitration panel applied the law of Monaco, expressly declin-
ing to rule on the law of other jurisdictions:3  “[T]he Panel . . . cannot 
come to a conclusion on whether or not the [World Athletics] . . . Regu-
lations would be found to be unenforceable in, or contrary to the domes-
tic law of, different national jurisdictions.”4 
Since USA Track and Field, Inc. (“USATF”) is an affiliate of World 
Athletics, analyzing whether the decision would apply in the United 
States is not merely an academic exercise, as many more international 
track meets—including the World Championships scheduled for 2022 in 
Eugene, Oregon—occur in the U.S. than in Monaco.5  This article will 
explore how a U.S. court would rule if Ms. Semenya, or someone simi-
larly situated,6 brought a case in a U.S. federal court to enjoin the appli-
cation of World Athletics’ Eligibility Regulations for the Female Clas-
sification (Athletes with Differences of Sex Development) (DSD 
Regulations). 
After providing some background, this article briefly describes, for 
context, a closely related CAS arbitration that set the stage for the Se-
menya arbitration.  The earlier arbitration was won by a female runner 
who, like Ms. Semenya, had testosterone levels deemed too high.7  In its 
decision, the CAS determined, inter alia, that athletic ability was too 
complex to depend on any one factor like testosterone.8  That case, which 
the panel that issued the recent arbitration decision in Semenya’s case 
 
 2. Sean Ingle, Semenya loses landmark legal case against IAAF over testosterone lev-
els, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/sport/2019/may/01/caster-semenya-loses-landmark-legal-case-iaaf-athletics. World 
Athletics was formerly known as the International Association of Athletics Federations 
(“IAAF”). About World Athletics, WORLD ATHLETICS, https://www.worldathlet-
ics.org/about-iaaf (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). For purposes of clarity, the organization will be 
referred to herein as World Athletics except in quotations and titles where the former name 
was used. 
 3. Semenya, CAS 2018/O/5794 at 110, ¶ 424. 
 4. Id. at 145, ¶ 555. 
 5. See, e.g., Calendar/Results, WORLD ATHLETICS (2020), https://www.worldathlet-
ics.org/competition/calendar/2019#180 (showing that in 2019, there were six World Athletics 
events in the United States and one event in Monaco); World Athletics Championships Ore-
gon22 to be Held July 15-24, 2022, USATF (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.usatf.org/news/2020/world-athletics-championships-oregon22-to-be-held- 
[hereinafter Oregon22]. 
 6. Oregon22, supra note 5. 
 7. Chand v. Athletics Fed’n of India (AFI), CAS 2014/A/3759, Interim Arbitral Award, 
5, ¶16, 2, ¶1 (2015). 
 8. Id. at 154, ¶ 532 (“[W]hile the evidence indicates that higher levels of naturally oc-
curring testosterone may increase athletic performance, the Panel is not satisfied that the de-
gree of that advantage is more significant than the advantage derived from the numerous other 
variables which the parties acknowledge also affect female athletic performance . . . .”). 
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did not consider as a binding precedent,9 helps to illuminate the Arbitra-
tion Award.  This article will then analyze the evidence and arguments 
set forth in the Arbitration Award. 
This article will then set out arguments that would likely be made 
in a U.S. court, both for and against any female athlete challenging the 
requirement that she take testosterone-reducing hormones in order to 
compete.  Finally, the article will reach a conclusion on whether a U.S. 
court would be likely to strike down the World Athletics regulations in 
question for purposes of U.S. competitions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The international track world has struggled with how to treat female 
competitors whose bodies produce a naturally-occurring amount of tes-
tosterone deemed too high by World Athletics.  Such a condition, known 
as hyperandrogenism, results in the production of an excess amount of 
androgen (such as testosterone) and occurs in five to ten percent of 
women.10  World Athletics initially adopted a set of regulations dealing 
with this topic entitled Regulations Governing Eligibility of Females 
with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women’s Competitions.11  After 
the Hyperandrogenism Regulations were successfully challenged by In-
dian sprinter Dutee Chand,12 World Athletics adopted the DSD Regula-
tions.13  Basically, the DSD Regulations mandate that female competi-
tors whose bodies contain more testosterone than World Athletics deems 
appropriate must take testosterone-reducing hormones in order to com-
pete internationally.14 
Ms. Semenya challenged the legality of the DSD Regulations at the 
CAS.15  She asserted a number of claims, including that the regulations 
 
 9. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 122, ¶ 471 (2019). 
 10. Susie East, Should a woman’s testosterone level matter in sports?, CNN (Aug. 12, 
2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/health/testosterone-and-hyperandrogen-
ism-in-female-athletes/index.html. 
 11. See generally IAAF, IAAF REGULATIONS GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY OF FEMALES 





 12. See infra Section III. 
 13. See IAAF, ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS FOR THE FEMALE CLASSIFICATION 
(ATHLETES WITH DIFFERENCES OF SEX DEVELOPMENT) 3, ¶ 2.3 (2019) [hereinafter DSD 
REGULATIONS]. 
 14. Id. at 3, ¶ 2.3(b). 
 15. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 2, ¶ 1 (2019). 
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discriminate “on the basis of sex and/or gender.”16  Although World Ath-
letics prevailed in the arbitration, it was a narrow victory, decided pur-
suant to the laws of Monaco,17 where World Athletics is headquartered.18  
As noted above, the Arbitration Award expressly states that the panel 
did not decide the arbitration based on law other than that of Monaco.19  
As a result, enforceability of the DSD Regulations outside of Monaco 
“will ultimately be a matter for the courts of the various jurisdictions in 
question to determine.”20 
Ms. Semenya appealed the Arbitration Award to the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, Switzerland’s supreme court.21  On August 25, 2020, the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by Ms. Semenya.22  
The Court found that “[t]he Court of Arbitration for Sport had the right 
to uphold the conditions of participation issued for female athletes with 
the genetic variant ‘46 XY DSD’ in order to guarantee fair competition 
for certain running disciplines in female athletics.”23  Regardless of the 
result of the appeal, the enforceability of the DSD Regulations is, by the 
express language of the Arbitration Award, an open question in the U.S. 
III. DUTEE CHAND V. IAAF: PRECURSOR TO THE SEMENYA 
ARBITRATION 
Indian sprinter Dutee Chand, who, like Ms. Semenya, had higher 
levels of naturally occurring testosterone than deemed appropriate by 
World Athletics,24 prevailed in a CAS arbitration against World Athlet-
ics regarding regulations that would have prevented her from competing 
because of her testosterone level.25  The CAS panel in the matter involv-
ing Ms. Semenya expressly stated, however, that “the findings and 
 
 16. Id. at 2, ¶ 2. 
 17. Id. at 110, ¶ 424. 
 18. About World Athletics, WORLD ATHLETICS, https://www.worldathletics.org/about-
iaaf (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
 19. See Semenya, CAS 2018/O/5794 at 109-10, ¶¶ 421-24 (explaining the decision to 
apply the law of Monaco in this case). 
 20. Id. at 145, ¶ 555. 
 21. Associated Press, Caster Semenya appeals testosterone ruling: ‘The IAAF will not drug 
me,’ L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/olympics/la-sp-
caster-semenya-appeals-testosterone-ruling-20190529-story.html. 
 22. Press Release, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, DSD Regulations: Caster Semenya’s 
Appeal Against the Decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Dismissed (Sept. 8, 2020) 
[hereinafter Press Release, DSD Regulations]; see Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, 
4A_248/2019 & 4A_398/2019, Judgment, (1st Court of Civil Law 2020). 
 23. Press Release, DSD Regulations, supra note 22. 
 24. Chand v. Athletics Fed’n of India (AFI), CAS 2014/A/3759, Interim Arbitral Award, 
8, ¶¶ 27-29 (2015). 
 25. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/5798, 
Executive Summary, 1, ¶¶ 2-4 (2019), https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_up-
load/CAS_Executive_Summary__5794_.pdf. 
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decision in Chand are in no way binding on this Panel,”26 at least in part 
because the prior arbitral ruling related to a different set of regulations.27 
Ms. Chand had an outstanding junior career, primarily focusing on 
the “200 metres sprint and the 4 x 400-metre sprint relay.”28  However, 
Ms. Chand’s ability to continue competing was called into question in 
2011 when World Athletics published its Hyperandrogenism Regula-
tions.29 
These regulations were intended to determine the eligibility of 
women with hyperandrogenism to compete in women’s track and field 
meets.30  Pursuant to the regulations, females with hyperandrogenism 
would be eligible to compete in women’s meets only if they participated 
in a three-level medical process and were determined to have androgen 
levels that World Athletics deemed appropriate.31 
After undergoing certain medical testing as required by the Athlet-
ics Federation of India (“AFI”), the Indian affiliate of World Athletics, 
Ms. Chand was notified that she would not be permitted to participate in 
the World Championships or the Commonwealth Games “because her 
‘male hormone’ levels were too high.”32  Subsequently, she was “provi-
sionally suspended from participating” in any sporting events.33 
Ms. Chand filed an appeal with the CAS against the AFI and World 
Athletics. 34  Ms. Chand claimed that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations 
discriminated against female athletes with “a particular natural physical 
characteristic” and were “based on flawed factual assumptions about the 
relationship between testosterone and athletic performance.”35  World 
Athletics contested each of Ms. Chand’s assertions.36 
In July 2015, the panel of arbitrators unanimously issued an interim 
arbitration award finding in favor of Ms. Chand.37  The arbitrators held 
that the male and female categories of competition are intended to cover 
all athletes; the arbitrators also expressed their concern that those like 
 
 26. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 122, ¶ 471 (2019). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2, ¶ 1. 
 29. Id. at 14-22, ¶¶ 41-68. 
 30. Id. at 14, ¶ 42. 
 31. HYPERANDROGENISM REGULATIONS, supra note 11, at 5. A female needed androgen 
less than or equal to ten nanomoles per liter or to have an androgen resistance such that they 
would not have a competitive advantage from the elevated levels of androgen. Id. at 12. 
 32. Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 5, ¶¶ 14-16. 
 33. Id. at 8, ¶ 27. 
 34. Id. at 10, ¶ 32. 
 35. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 160, ¶¶ 1-8. 
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Ms. Chand might not be allowed to compete at all.38  Specifically, the 
arbitrators found that: 
On the basis of the evidence currently before the Panel, the Panel is 
unable to conclude on the balance of probabilities that androgen-sen-
sitive hyperandrogenic female athletes enjoy such a substantial per-
formance advantage over non-hyperandrogenic female athletes that 
excluding them from competing in the female category, and thereby 
excluding them from competing at all unless they take medication or 
undergo treatment, is a necessary and proportionate means of pre-
serving fairness in athletics competition and/or policing the binary 
male/female classification.39 
The CAS panel specifically found that numerous other factors, including 
“nutrition, access to specialist training facilities and coaching, and other 
genetic and biological variations,” may increase athletic performance.40 
The arbitrators suspended the Hyperandrogenism Regulations for a 
period of two years, subject to World Athletics submitting additional ev-
idence and expert reports on the “actual degree of athletic performance 
advantage sustained by hyperandrogenic female athletes as compared to 
non-hyperandrogenic female athletes.”41  Absent such a submission, the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations would be deemed void after the two-
year suspension.42 
After obtaining an extension to submit additional evidence, World 
Athletics submitted materials to the CAS “including expert reports and 
legal submissions.”43  Among the materials submitted were “draft re-
vised regulations that would only apply to female track events over dis-
tances of between 400 meters and one mile.”44  World Athletics also 
submitted as its primary analysis a 2017 article from the British Journal 
of Sports Medicine (BG17).45 
 
 38. Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 148, ¶¶ 512-13. 
 39. Id. at 154, ¶ 532. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 160, ¶ 3. 
 42. Id. at 158, ¶ 548. 
 43. Media Release, Court of Arbitration for Sport Media Release, The Application of the 
IAAF Hyperandrogenism Regulations Remain Suspended (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.tas-
cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Media_Release_3759_Jan_2018.pdf [hereinafter CAS Media 
Release]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Press Release, International Association of Athletics Federations, Levelling the 
playing field in female sport: new research published in the British Journal of Sports Medicine 
(July 3, 2017), https://www.worldathletics.org/news/press-release/hyperandrogenism-re-
search; IAAF decides to take Dutee Chand gender case back to court, TIMES NOW (July 4, 
2017), https://www.timesnownews.com/sports/article/iaaf-decided-to-take-dutee-chand-gen-
der-case-back-to-court/65056; Stéphane Bermon & Pierre-Yves Garnier, Serum Androgen 
Levels and Their Relation to Performance in Track and Field: Mass Spectrometry Results 
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The CAS determined that World Athletics’ submission of addi-
tional evidence was sufficiently compliant but, with the consent of the 
parties, suspended the proceedings for six months, during which the 
World Athletics Hyperandrogenism Regulations would remain sus-
pended.46  Moreover, the CAS decreed that the arbitration proceedings 
would continue in the event World Athletics decided not to withdraw the 
existing regulations, and would be terminated in the event World Ath-
letics withdrew the existing regulations or replaced them with the pro-
posed new regulations.47 
In March 2018, World Athletics informed the CAS that it was going 
to withdraw the Hyperandrogenism Regulations challenged by Ms. 
Chand and replace them with the DSD Regulations, which were enacted 
in April 2018,48 and came into effect on November 1, 2018,49 providing 
the predicate for Ms. Semenya’s arbitration. 
IV. CASTER SEMENYA V. IAAF 
The first words in the Arbitration Award under the heading 
“MERITS” are 
Ms. Semenya is a woman.  At birth, it was determined that she was 
female . . . . She has been raised as a woman.  She has lived as a 
woman.  She has run as a woman.  She is—and always has been—
recognized in law as a woman and has always identified as a 
woman.50 
Obviously, Ms. Semenya’s legal sex was not what the case was about.  
Rather, according to World Athletics, the case turned on whether she had 
a so-called “male sports sex.”51  That determination, in turn, depended 
on the testimony of numerous expert witnesses on both sides.52  Ulti-
mately, the majority of the panel agreed with the experts offered by 
World Athletics,53 although the panel did not specifically rule on the 
term “male sports sex.”54  Instead, the ruling was on the issue whether 
 
from 2127 Observations in Male and Female Elite Athletes, 51 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 1, 2 
(May 15, 2017). 
 46. CAS Media Release, supra note 43. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 
2018/5798, Executive Summary, 1, ¶¶ 4-5 (2019), https://www.tas-cas.org/filead-
min/user_upload/CAS_Executive_Summary__5794_.pdf. 
 49. See Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 
2018/O/5798, Arbitral Award, 3, ¶ 10 (2019). 
 50. Id. at 118, ¶ 454. 
 51. Id. at 132-33, ¶¶ 501-07. 
 52. See id. at 4-10, ¶¶ 15-53, 12-15, ¶¶ 56-71, 17-22, ¶¶ 79-108. 
 53. See id. at 108, ¶ 415, 160, ¶ 626. 
 54. Id. at 133, ¶ 507. 
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intersex women “have an athletic advantage over other female athletes 
and, if so, whether the magnitude of that advantage is capable of sub-
verting fair competition in certain athletic events.”55 
The expert testimony depended on questions relating to endocrinol-
ogy and other complex areas of science, which are beyond the scope of 
this article.  What will be explored below, however, are undisputed facts 
about the evidence on which a majority of the arbitration panel relied. 
The primary public World Athletics arguments were set out in 
BG17, the British Journal of Sports Medicine article previously submit-
ted by World Athletics in connection with the Dutee Chand arbitration, 
and referenced in section III, supra.  A number of key undisputed facts 
undermine the credibility and viability of BG17, however. 
The first undisputed fact about that article is that it was co-authored 
by a consultant and an employee of World Athletics, Stéphane Bermon 
and Pierre Yves-Garnier, respectively.56  At the end of the article there 
is a “Disclaimer” in bold type that reads, in relevant part: 
SB [Stéphane Bermon] is a medical and scientific consultant for the 
IAAF and a member of the IAAF and IOC working groups on hy-
perandrogenic female athletes and transgender athletes and for that 
purpose appeared as a witness in the Dutee Chand vs IAAF CAS 
case.  PYG [Pierre Yves-Garnier] is the director of the IAAF Health 
and Science Department . . . .57 
The fact that the co-authors of the article are employed or retained by 
World Athletics creates a serious conflict of interest; it is unlikely in the 
extreme that they would write anything against the interests of the or-
ganization that signs their paychecks. 
The second undisputed fact about that article is that some of the 
data on which it was based was problematic.  That fact was expressly 
noted in a New York Times article,58 and also acknowledged by Mr. Ber-
mon, who co-authored BG17, in a second article on the topic that ap-
peared in the British Journal of Sports Medicine (BHKE18).59 
The second article begins “[w]e thank our colleagues for their con-
structive comments that relate to [BG17].”  It goes on to state that “[t]o 
 
 55. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award,. at 133, ¶ 507. 
 56. Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 6. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Jeré Longman, Did Flawed Data Lead Track Astray on Testosterone in Women?, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/sports/iaaf-caster-se-
menya.html. 
 59. See Stéphane Bermon, Angelica Lindén Hirschberg, Jan Kowalski & Emma Eklund, 
Serum androgen levels are positively correlated with athletic performance and competition 
results in elite female athletes, 52 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 1531, 1531-32 (2018). 
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address the other criticisms, we have now performed a sensitivity anal-
ysis using a modified data set in which (1) observations from athletes 
who participated in both World Championships were only counted  
once . . . .”60 The result was that the authors of BHKE18 “excluded 230 
observations, corrected some data capture errors and performed the mod-
ified analysis on a population of 1102 female athletes.”61  This signifi-
cant change in the data used to perform the analysis is an acknowledg-
ment that the data relied upon in drafting BG17 was questionable. 
The third undisputed fact relates to peer review of the articles.  The 
co-authors of BG17 state at the end that it was “externally peer re-
viewed,”62 although clearly that alleged external peer review did not de-
tect some serious errors.  However, the co-authors of BHKE18 state at 
the end of the article that it was “internally peer reviewed.”63  Internal 
peer review, which is undefined and appears to be a contradiction in 
terms, does not rise to the level of a trusted peer review of a scientific 
work. 
The fourth undisputed fact is that, although the Arbitration Award 
upheld the DSD Regulations as they relate to the one mile and the 1500-
meter races, it acknowledges that the evidence presented by World Ath-
letics is sparse at best, and speculative at worst with respect to those in-
cluded races.64  Regarding speculation, the Arbitration Award states that 
[o]n the basis of the evidence presented to the Panel, the IAAF’s de-
cision to include the 1500m and 1 mile events within the list of Re-
stricted Events seems to be based, at least in part, on speculation that 
athletes who compete in the 800m also compete successfully in the 
1500m and 1 mile.65 
Regarding sparseness, the Arbitration Award states that “the evidence of 
actual (in contrast to theoretical) significant athletic advantage by a suf-
ficient number of 46 XY DSD athletes [females with high testosterone 






 60. Id. at 1531. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 6. 
 63. Bermon et al., supra note 59, at 1532. 
 64. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 156, ¶¶ 608-09 (2019). 
 65. Id. at 156, ¶ 608. 
 66. Id. at 160, ¶ 623. 
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V. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
DSD REGULATIONS IN THE U.S. 
Should Caster Semenya or someone similarly situated challenge the 
validity of the DSD Regulations in an American court, there are several 
arguments that World Athletics might assert to justify the existence of 
those regulations.  What follows is an analysis of those arguments and 
the likely responses with respect to each. 
A. Do U.S. Courts have Jurisdiction? 
1. World Athletics will likely contend that the CAS has exclusive 
jurisdiction 
The World Athletics Constitution provides that final decisions 
made by World Athletics under its Constitution “may be appealed ex-
clusively to the CAS (Appeal Arbitration Division) which will resolve 
the dispute definitively in accordance with the CAS Code of Sports-re-
lated Arbitration.”67 Moreover, the DSD Regulations expressly state: 
Any dispute between the IAAF and an affected athlete (and/or her 
Member Federation) in connection with these Regulations will be 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CAS.  In particular (but 
without limitation), the validity, legality and/or proper interpretation 
or application of the Regulations may only be challenged (a) by way 
of ordinary proceedings filed before the CAS; and/or (b) as part of 
an appeal to the CAS made pursuant to clause 5.3.68  (emphasis 
added) 
In addition, the DSD Regulations provide: 
The decision of the CAS will be final and binding on all parties, and 
no right of appeal will lie from that decision.  All parties waive ir-
revocably any right to any form of appeal, review or recourse by or 
in any court or judicial authority in respect of such decision, insofar 
as such waiver may be validly made.69 
As a result, World Athletics likely would contend that the CAS has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to rule on claims such as those that might be brought 
by Ms. Semenya or another challenger to the DSD Regulations.  Ms. 
Semenya, who did not object to the jurisdiction of the CAS,70 pursued 
 
 67. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATHLETICS FEDERATIONS (IAAF) 
CONSTITUTION § 84.3 (2019). 
 68. DSD REGULATIONS, supra note 13, at 10. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 109, ¶ 418 (2019). 
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arbitration before a CAS panel.71  As a result, litigation before other tri-
bunals would be contrary to the express provisions of the World Athlet-
ics Constitution and the DSD Regulations. 
2. Likely Response of Challenger to DSD Regulations 
Ms. Semenya, or another challenger to the DSD Regulations, can 
happily concede that the CAS has exclusive jurisdiction and that the 
CAS decision is final and binding on all parties.  This concession would 
be helpful to Ms. Semenya because, as noted in Sections I and II, supra, 
the CAS stated that it could not rule on the law of jurisdictions different 
from Monaco, including the U.S.72  The final holding of the Arbitration 
Award left such rulings “for the courts of the various jurisdictions in 
question to determine,”73 including the courts of the United States. 
Ms. Semenya would have standing to sue in the U.S. because a track 
meet there would be under the auspices of the USATF,74 the U.S. affili-
ate of World Athletics.75  The Bylaws of the USATF provide that one of 
its duties is to implement the regulations of World Athletics, which pur-
port to benefit track and field athletes: “USATF is affiliated to the WA 
[World Athletics] . . . USATF shall recognize accept, apply, observe and 
abide by the Constitution, Rules and Regulations of the WA . . . as 
amended from time to time, unless any of these documents conflict with 
federal or state law.”76 
There is no doubt that U.S. courts have personal jurisdiction over 
the USATF, a non-profit organization incorporated in Virginia,77 with 
its headquarters and principal place of business in Indianapolis, Indi-
ana.78  USATF can be, and has been, sued in U.S. courts.79 
It is also clear that Ms. Semenya would have standing to sue the 
USATF because, as a participant in a meet held by USATF in the U.S., 
 
 71. Id. at 4, ¶ 14. 
 72. Id. at 145, ¶ 555. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., Oregon22, supra note 5. 
 75. USATF, 2020 GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK § 3(B)(14) (2020). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Clerk’s Information System, VA. ST. CORP. COMMISSION, https://cis.scc.vir-
ginia.gov/EntitySearch/BusinessInformation?businessId=78443&businessType=Non-
stock%20Corporation&Source=fromFormation&isSeries=False (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); 
Tax Information, USATF, https://www.usatf.org/about/financials/tax-information (last vis-
ited Oct. 26, 2020). 
 78. About, USATF, https://www.usatf.org/about (last visited Oct. 1, 2020). 
 79. See, e.g., Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Strike Paragraphs 17 & 24 of 
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Logan v. USA Track & Field, Inc., Cause No. 1:10-cv-1315-TWP-TAB 
(S.D. Ind. 2010). 
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she is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between World Athletics 
and the USATF.  There is precedent to support this proposition. 
In a case brought by a college athlete against the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), the collegiate sports governing 
organization, the athlete’s standing was based on his status as a third-
party beneficiary of the contract between the NCAA and one of its mem-
bers, the University of Colorado, where the athlete attended.80  The court 
stated: 
A person not a party to an express contract may bring an action on 
the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the 
nonparty, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely 
incidental benefit of the contract . . . the NCAA’s constitution, by-
laws, and regulations evidence a clear intent to benefit student-ath-
letes.  And because each student-athlete’s eligibility to compete is 
determined by the NCAA, we conclude that Bloom had standing . . . 
to contest the meaning or applicability of NCAA eligibility re-
strictions . . . .  See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796-97 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997) (given importance of NCAA’s function to benefit student-
athletes and NCAA’s role in determining eligibility of student-ath-
letes, court assumed student athlete was likely to succeed in proving 
third-party beneficiary standing vis-a-vis the contract between the 
NCAA and its members); see also NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d 
1081, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]o the extent Bloom’s claim of arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion asserts a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing that 
is implied in the contractual relationship between the NCAA and its 
members, his position as a third-party beneficiary of that contractual 
relationship affords him standing to pursue this claim . . . . [S]ee also 
Hall v. NCAA, supra, 985 F. Supp. at 784 (implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing ‘requires that a party vested with contractual discre-
tion exercise that discretion reasonably, not arbitrarily or capri-
ciously’).81 
Thus, it is readily apparent that Ms. Semenya or someone else pursuing 






 80. Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004). 
 81. Id. at 623-24. 
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B. Should U.S. Courts Defer to Policies on Internal Management of 
Private Sports Organizations? 
1. World Athletics will likely contend that U.S. courts should 
refuse to interfere in the internal management of private 
sports organizations 
There is a longstanding common law rule that courts should be re-
luctant to intervene or interfere in the internal management of private 
organizations.82  This rule was intended to allow such organizations to 
establish their own rules and policies and abide by those rules without 
interference from outside forces. 
The theory behind this non-interference doctrine is that the individ-
ual members of such associations have the freedom to choose their 
associates and the conditions of their association; further, it is ar-
gued, judicial review of the affairs of such associations would violate 
this basic principle of the freedom to associate. . . . [Moreover,] the 
rules and regulations upon which these associations operate are often 
unclear, and the courts would have no available standard upon which 
to determine the reasonableness of their rules.83 
The same is true when it comes to private sports organizations.84 
 
 82. See, e.g., Plummer v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 97 F.3d 220, 226 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (citing State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court of Marion Cty., 233 Ind. 235, 117 
N.E.2d 553, 555 (1954)) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Indiana has recognized in very clear terms, 
private voluntary associations do have a “sacred right” to make, interpret, and enforce rules 
governing the ethical conduct of their own members”); Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc’y, 
34 N.J. 582, 590, 170 A.2d 791, 796 (1961) (New Jersey Supreme Court stated “Courts have 
been understandably reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of membership associations 
and their reluctance has ordinarily promoted the health of society”); Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Ass’n v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 554, 13 S.W. 379, 380 (1890) (Texas Supreme Court held that 
by being a member of private organization, “the member assents to and accepts the constitu-
tion, and impliedly binds himself to abide by the decision of such boards as that instrument 
may provide”); Am. Fed’n of Tech. Eng’rs, Local 144 v. La Jeunesse, 63 Ill. 2d 263, 268, 347 
N.E.2d 712, 715 (1976) (Illinois Supreme Court expressed “[i]t is generally held that courts 
. . . will not intervene in questions involving the enforcement of bylaws and matters of disci-
pline in voluntary associations”). 
 83. Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 556-57 (Ala. 1979) [citations omitted]. 
That case in turn cites cases as far back as 1884 in support of that proposition: Weatherly v. 
Med. & Surgical Soc’y of Montgomery Cty., 76 Ala. 567 (1884); see also NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Ky. 
2001). 
 84. See, e.g., Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 656 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Crouch v. Nat’l Ass’n. for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 845 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Schulz v. U. S. Boxing Ass’n, 105 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[c]ourts have been under-
standably reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of [private] associations and their re-
luctance has ordinarily promoted the health of society”) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted); Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 542 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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Ms. Semenya and those similarly situated voluntarily chose to par-
ticipate in international track and field competitions.  The governing 
bodies for each country and the international governing bodies of such 
competitions get to set the rules for participation.85  World Athletics 
would contend that the courts should not interfere with the policies and 
procedures established by those organizations in seeking to manage the 
internal workings of the organizations themselves, and the sporting 
events that they oversee. 
2. Likely Response of Challenger to DSD Regulations 
U.S. courts have frequently judged the activities of private sports 
organizations like World Athletics and USATF.86  Although courts are 
reluctant to interfere in the affairs of private athletic organizations, they 
will do so, and have done so—particularly concerning matters of eligi-
bility, as in this case—when “the actions of an association are the result 
of fraud, lack of jurisdiction, collusion, arbitrariness, or are in violation 
of or contravene any principle of public policy.”87 
The U.S. Supreme Court has delineated the standard for what is ar-
bitrary and capricious.88  As with interfering into the affairs of a private 
athletic association, courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for 
that of an administrative agency, but will do so if agency actions are 
arbitrary and capricious: 
The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.  Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data 
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a 
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’89 
Moreover, although the courts are generally hesitant to intervene in the 
affairs of private associations, they will intervene when the actions of 
private organizations contravene public policy.90  Clearly, a private 
 
 85. See, e.g., Book of Rules, WORLD ATHLETICS, https://www.worldathletics.org/about-
iaaf/documents/book-of-rules (last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
 86. See, e.g., Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (D. Or. 
2016), aff’d, 899 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2018); Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 505 U.S. 
1301 (1992). 
 87. Gulf South Conference, 369 So. 2d at 557. 
 88. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 89. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)). In the Motor Vehicles case, the agency’s action was determined by the U.S. Supreme 
Court to be arbitrary and capricious, and the matter was therefore remanded to the agency for 
further consideration consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court. Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 56-57. 
 90. See, e.g., Gulf South Conference, 369 So. 2d at 557; Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med. 
Soc’y, 34 N.J. 582, 590, 170 A.2d 791, 796 (1961). 
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organization establishing rules that are in violation of discrimination 
laws intended to protect members of classes that have historically been 
discriminated against would be a public policy the courts would seek to 
protect. 
The courts will intervene when the underlying conduct is arbitrary 
and capricious or when the policies of sports organizations are contrary 
to public policy, even in cases involving private sports organization. 
C. Are the DSD Regulations a Justified and Proportionate Way to 
Ensure Fairness? 
1. World Athletics will contend that the DSD Regulations are a 
“justified and proportionate means of ensuring 
consistent treatment, and preserving fair and meaningful 
competition within the female classification.”91 
 The basic position of World Athletics has been that the DSD Reg-
ulations are not discriminatory, but that, even if found discriminatory, 
they are “necessary, reasonable and proportionate to the achievement of 
a legitimate objective.”92  World Athletics further has contended that the 
DSD Regulations are: 
based on a strong scientific, legal and ethical foundation . . . [and] 
establish a framework governing the eligibility of 46 XY DSD ath-
letes to compete in the female category that is logical and rational 
and fully respects the requirement that like cases should be treated 
alike and different cases should be treated differently.93 
Furthermore, World Athletics has asserted that it is “both entitled and 
required to provide male and female athletes with an equal chance to 
excel in elite-level athletics.”94  In order to allow females to have such a 
chance, World Athletics must have separate categories of competition 
for men and women, and must prevent competitors with significant bio-
logical advantages from competing against women.95  World Athletics 
has further asserted that women athletes determined to have male chro-
mosomes (i.e., XY rather than XX) are “ ‘ biologically identical’ to male 
athletes (save with respect to virilisation of external genitals) . . . [and] 
derive performance benefits from their physiology that are 
 
 91. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 108, ¶ 415 (2019). 
 92. Id. at 144, ¶ 548. 
 93. Id. at 71, ¶ 286. 
 94. Id. at 71, ¶ 287. 
 95. Id. at 71-73, ¶¶ 287-89. 
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indistinguishable from the advantages derived by male athletes.”96  Fi-
nally, World Athletics has contended that it had to take steps “to remove 
or at least minimise as much as possible those ergogenic advantages.”97 
World Athletics has argued, and can be expected to continue argu-
ing, that the DSD Regulations are thus necessary to ensure a fair and 
balanced playing field.98  Given that athletes like Ms. Semenya can com-
pete against females in international competitions if they take steps to 
reduce their testosterone to acceptable levels,99 World Athletics contends 
that the DSD Regulations are reasonable and proportionate.  “In the ab-
sence of the DSD Regulations, the divide between the male and female 
categories would be policed by legal sex or self-declarations of gender 
identity, thereby denying female athletes an equal chance to excel in 
sport.”100 
2. Likely Response of Challenger to DSD Regulations 
Ms. Semenya would likely respond that the evidence submitted in 
support of World Athletics’ position is not admissible under U.S. law.  
Rule 702 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence permits testimony by a 
qualified expert only if it “will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”101 
The landmark case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (now codified in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence), set standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence to 
be applied by the trial court judge.102  The court mandates the use of 
scientific knowledge, but: 
in order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or asser-
tion must be derived by the scientific method.  Proposed testimony 
must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ 
based on what is known.  In short, the requirement that an expert’s 
testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of 
evidentiary reliability.103 
The Daubert Court set out criteria for “whether a theory or technique is 
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact.”104  One of these 
 
 96. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 75, ¶ 296 (2019). 
 97. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 98. Id. at 76, ¶ 300. 
 99. Id. at 77, ¶ 307. 
 100. Id. at 79, ¶ 311. 
 101. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
 102. Id.; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579-98 (1993). 
 103. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 104. Id. at 593. 
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criteria is whether the knowledge “can be (and has been) tested.”105  
“ ‘ Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and 
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is 
what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.’ ” 106 
A second criteria set by the Daubert Court is “whether the theory 
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.”107  Alt-
hough the court acknowledges that publication is not essential for ad-
missibility—for example, for “well-grounded but innovative theories”—
it would support admissibility because “submission to the scrutiny of the 
scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because 
it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be 
detected.”108 
A third criteria set out by the Daubert Court is “general ac-
ceptance.”109  The court notes that “[w]idespread acceptance can be an 
important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible . . . .”110 
U.S. courts applying the above criteria likely would rule that World 
Athletics’ evidence supporting the DSD Regulation is inadmissible.  
First, as noted in Section IV, supra, regarding the 1500m and one-mile 
races, the evidence is either speculative or sparse.  Not only does that 
level of evidence not meet the standards of Daubert, but also it does not 
amount to the preponderance of evidence necessary to meet the burden 
of proof in a civil case in the U.S. 
Second, as also noted above in Section IV, it is undisputed that the 
key empirical, publicly known data on which the evidence is based is 
flawed.  The scientists who first reported these flaws were quoted exten-
sively in the New York Times article referenced in Section IV, supra.111  
For example, Roger Pielke Jr., the director of the Sports Governance 
Center at the University of Colorado, stated: “I think everyone can un-
derstand that if your data set is contaminated by as much as one-third 
bad data, it’s kind of a garbage-in, garbage-out situation . . . . I really see 
no option for [World Athletics] other than to retract the paper.”112  Erik 
Boye, one of the independent researchers who heads the Department of 
Cell Biology at Oslo University Hospital,113 added “the data [World 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Longman, supra note 58. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Department of Cell Biology, OSLO U. HOSP., https://www.ous-research.no/cellbiol-
ogy/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
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Athletics] have presented is not solid.”114  He further criticized World 
Athletics for lack of transparency regarding the data, and “doing every-
thing with their hands over the data.”115 
A third independent researcher, Ross Tucker, a professor of exer-
cise physiology who  taught at the School of Medicine of the University 
of the Free State in South Africa and is currently at the University of 
Cape Town, stated that the original study is “entirely untrustworthy” and 
that a subsequent study by World Athletics using the same data with the 
errors purportedly thrown out included “too much uncertainty to 
trust.”116  Concerning the subsequent World Athletics study,  Pielke 
commented that “[t]his is an effort at what I would call a do-over, and 
it’s embarrassing and it’s not how science is expected to be done.”117  
Concerning the lack of transparency and the fact that affiliates of World 
Athletics authored BG17, Pielke stated “[y]ou don’t have drug compa-
nies doing their own studies that no one else can see.”118 
These comments demonstrate that the evidence in BG17 and 
BHKE18 does not meet the standards of the Daubert case.  BG17 was 
admittedly flawed, and the article allegedly correcting its errors was not 
peer reviewed. 
Furthermore, BG17 itself acknowledges that the studies do not ex-
plain any cause-and-effect relationship between testosterone and athletic 
performance: “Our study design cannot provide evidence for causality 
between androgen levels and athletic performance” but rather consists 
solely of observations of results of males and females with differing lev-
els of testosterone at two track and field world championship events.119  
Lack of proof of a cause-and-effect relationship led to numerous specu-
lative statements in BG17, speculation that would not be admissible in a 
U.S. court.120  The speculative statements include: 
 
- “A possible explanation for these findings is the important contri-
bution of oxidative metabolism in the total energy spent to run a 
400 or 800 m race.”121 
 
 
 114. Longman, supra note 58. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; ross tucker (international), ERGOSPORT MODELS, https://ergosportmod-
els.com/models/dr-ross-tucker/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 117. Longman, supra note 58. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Bermon & Garnier, supra at note 45, at 3. 
 120. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
 121. Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 5. 
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- “Our hypothesis is that, in addition to their recognised effect on 
aggressiveness and risk-taking behaviours, androgens exert their 
ergogenic effects on some sportswomen through better visuo-spa-
tial neural activation.”122 
 
- “One explanation could be the higher prevalence of doping with 
exogenous androgens in this subgroup.”123 
 
- “Hence, the known negative influence of fat mass on SHBG con-
centration and T bioavailability may possibly account for the low 
T and SHBG concentrations reported in male throwers in our 
study.”124 
 
- “In female athletes, a high fT concentration appears to confer a 
1.8-2.8% competitive advantage in long sprint and 800 m races.”125 
 
- “As androgens are erythropoietic hormones, it is tempting to hy-
pothesise that female athletes with high T and fT levels show high 
Hb concentrations which in turn increase the oxygen-carrying ca-
pacity and (non-bicarbonate) extracellular buffering capacity — 
both of which are crucial when running 400 m, 400 m hurdles or 
800 m races.”126 
 
- “Increased lean body mass, mental drive and aggressiveness, which 
are also known to be influenced by androgens, provide alternative 
explanations, but these parameters have not been measured in 
the present study.”127 
 
- “Such a finding might be a consequence of either a higher preva-
lence of doping with androgens or a higher adiposity in this group 
of athletic events.”128 
 
- “. . . the results obtained in pole vaulters and hammer throwers 
seem to confirm that females with high levels of androgens may 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 5. 
 128. Id. at 6. 
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Because the scientific evidence of World Athletics would not likely be 
admissible in a U.S. court, World Athletics’ arguments that its regula-
tions are for the purpose of ensuring equal treatment should fail for lack 
of evidence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By far the most extraordinary claim of World Athletics is that it is 
above the law.  As noted in the Arbitration Award, “Regulation 1.2 pro-
vides that the DSD Regulations ‘operate globally’ and therefore ‘are to 
be interpreted and applied not by reference to national or local laws, but 
rather as an independent and autonomous text . . . .’ ” 130 CAS, however, 
has now definitively ruled that, outside of Monaco, the DSD Regulations 
are subject to national and local laws.  Furthermore, as demonstrated 
above, the DSD Regulations would not pass muster in a U.S. federal 
court. 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798, 
Arbitral Award, 111, ¶ 427 (2019). 
